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Abstract
Is it always wise to disclose good news? When both the sender and the receiver have private
information about the sender￿ s quality, we ￿nd that the worst sender type with good news has
the most incentive to disclose it, so reporting good news can paradoxically make the sender look
bad. If the good news is attainable by su¢ ciently mediocre types, or if the sender is already
expected to be of a relatively high type, nondisclosure equilibria exist in which good news is
withheld. Since the sender has a legitimate fear of looking too eager to reveal good news,
having a third party disclose the news, or mandating that the sender disclose the news, can help
the sender. The predictions are tested by examining when faculty use titles such as ￿Dr￿and
￿Professor￿in voicemail greetings and course syllabi.
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modeste qui est di¢ cile.
￿Jules Renard
Don￿ t be humble, you￿ re not that great.
￿Golda Meir
1 Introduction
If you have good news should you disclose it? The standard answer is yes because otherwise people
will skeptically assume that you have nothing favorable to report (Viscusi, 1978; Grossman and
Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). But in practice people
are often unsure about whether to reveal good news, and nondisclosure is frequently observed. For
instance, talented students are often reluctant to brag about their grades, highly educated people do
not always list their degrees, some donors make anonymous donations, people sometimes withhold
favorable arguments to avoid ￿protesting too much￿ , overachievers often engage in understatement,
￿rms do not always release positive earnings information, and advertisers of high quality products
sometimes use a ￿soft sell￿approach.
Most of the literature explains such anomalies by examining why the absence of good news is not
always treated skeptically. Answers include that messages are costly (Viscusi, 1978; Jovanovic, 1983;
Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986), there are strategic reasons for withholding information (Dye, 1986;
Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990; Giovannoni and Seidmann, 2002), the sender herself is not always fully
informed (Dye, 1985; Farrell, 1986; Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990; Shin, 1994, 2003), or the receiver
is na￿ve (Dye, 1998), uninformed (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003), or boundedly attentive (Hirshleifer
et al., 2002).
While these approaches explain many cases of nondisclosure, they do not capture the idea that
boasting about good news might itself be treated skeptically. To see how revealing good news can
paradoxically make one look bad, we consider situations where the sender can reveal good news that
is unambiguously favorable and perhaps even the best available, but still not impressive. When good
news is relatively common, is boasting about it still a good idea? Or is boasting treated with such
skepticism that modesty is the policy?
For instance, consider whether a restaurant should disclose its health department ratings. Start-
ing in 1998, Los Angeles health o¢ cials began requiring restaurants to post large hygiene grades
at their entrances, with a high proportion of grades being an A (see Jin and Leslie, 2003). Why
was it necessary to require even A restaurants to disclose their grade? Suppose diners have their
own opinions based on experience or reputation, so good restaurants tend to do well even without
disclosure. In this case it is the worst restaurants within the A category who have the strongest
incentive to prove that they meet basic hygiene standards. Given this incentive, disclosure of even
an A grade can be interpreted by diners unfavorably.
Or consider whether a person with a PhD should use the title ￿Dr.￿ In many environments
PhDs are relatively rare so using a title is a strongly favorable signal of the person￿ s professional
credentials and we would expect titles to be used frequently. But in other environments, such as
1elite universities, PhDs are quite common. In more applied ￿elds faculty interact frequently with
non-academics so a PhD might still be worth boasting about, but in more theoretical ￿elds most
interactions are between people who expect each other to have the appropriate credentials. In such
￿elds using a title might then be interpreted not just as redundant, but as a signal that the person
fears being thought of as unquali￿ed without the title.
To capture the intuition of these examples we relax the assumptions of the standard disclosure
model in two ways. First, rather than assuming that only the sender has private information, we
allow the receiver to also have private information about sender type. For instance, a diner has her
own impression of restaurant quality based on personal experience. Second, rather than assuming
that the sender can fully reveal her type with a veri￿able message, we assume that the sender can
only reveal a range within which her type falls. For instance, a restaurant cannot reveal its exact
quality but can reveal its hygiene grade. Or a person can reveal having passed a test or having
received a degree, but cannot reveal her exact ability.
With this added realism, we ￿nd that disclosure need not be the unique equilibrium. Instead,
we ￿nd that a nondisclosure equilibrium surviving standard re￿nements always exists if good news
is attainable by su¢ ciently mediocre types. For instance, in the case of restaurant hygiene cards,
the system allows a high proportion of restaurants to receive an A. Similarly, the phenomenon of
grade in￿ ation means that a large proportion of moderately serious high school and college students
receive primarily A grades. When the best news is attainable even by mediocre types, boasting
about the news is not necessarily a positive sign so nondisclosure can be an equilibrium.
From a modelling perspective, these results imply that the standard assumptions of no private
receiver information and existence of a veri￿able message for each sender type require justi￿cation
based on the particular situation. For instance, in auctions the seller and the buyers are all likely
to have private information (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). The disclosure literature would seem to
imply that the seller will reveal any veri￿able information to buyers.1 However, because the buyers
have private information, our results imply that this intuition from disclosure games will hold only
if the seller￿ s veri￿able information is su¢ ciently favorable or su¢ ciently ￿ne.2
From an empirical perspective, the main testable implication of the model is that the frequency
of nondisclosure should be negatively correlated with the rarity (or relative di¢ culty) of the good
news. For instance, in the restaurant example if it became more di¢ cult to receive an A then we
would expect more disclosure. Even if the standard for good news does not change, the model
predicts that the frequency of disclosure should be negatively correlated with any public signal that
is positively correlated with sender type. That is, if the conditional distribution of sender types is
weighted toward higher types because of a favorable public signal, then good news is no longer that
impressive so disclosure is less likely. In contrast with many sender-receiver models, the predictions
can therefore be readily tested using public information.3
Based on this implication, we test the model by looking at when PhDs use the title of ￿PhD￿ ,
1Information disclosure in auctions is important not just because it helps allocate the good more e¢ ciently but
because the ￿linkage principle￿(Milgrom and Weber, 1982) implies that such disclosure will on average help the seller.
For an analysis of how a seller can credibly reveal information when it is not veri￿able, see Chakraborty et al. (2001).
2Bag (2003) shows that a sender will always reveal to all bidders the number of bidders in an auction. Since this
number is exact, there is no contradiction with our results.
3In a signaling model the size of the signal is normally increasing in the sender￿ s type which is the sender￿ s private
information. Since sender type is not known by the receiver it is typically not known by the econometrician, so
empirical tests often use indirect methods to evaluate the theory (Bedard, 2001). Here we predict that understatement
is more likely based on public signals of the sender￿ s type.
2￿Dr￿ or ￿Professor￿ and when they forgo using such a title. In particular we look at the use of
these titles in voicemail greetings and course syllabi by PhD-holding professors in the 26 economics
departments in the University of California and California State systems. We predict that the use
of titles will be more common in the 16 departments without doctoral programs than in the eight
departments with doctoral programs for two reasons. First, the proportion of PhD-holding professors
in the former group is lower and, until recent years, was substantially lower. Second, professors in
the former group are less likely to be research-oriented and therefore more likely to have a higher
proportion of their interactions with students and non-academics. For both these reasons, holding
a PhD is more likely to represent ￿good news￿for a typical professor in the departments without a
doctoral program. We ￿nd that, for both voicemail greetings and syllabi, professors in departments
with doctoral programs are signi￿cantly less likely to use a title.
The model o⁄ers insight into several policy issues. First is the long-standing question of when
disclosure should be mandatory. The existence of nondisclosure equilibria implies that mandatory
disclosure, or having a third party disclose the news, can reduce communication problems due to
nondisclosure and to confusion over multiple equilibria.4 Second is the question of how to set the
di¢ culty of standards, e.g., school grades or other certi￿cates of quality. The literature typically
trades o⁄ the gains from forcing higher quality among those who meet the standard against the
losses of lower rates of attainment (Costrell, 1994). Our model suggests that higher standards have
the additional advantage of being less likely to induce a nondisclosure equilibrium. Third is the
question of how ￿ne or coarse standards should be, e.g., whether to use numerical grades or letter
grades. We show that if the message space is su¢ ciently ￿ne and accurately measures quality then
full disclosure is the unique equilibrium. This follows from the standard ￿unravelling result￿that
types with the best news reveal it, so types with the next best news will also reveal it so as not to be
thought of as even worse, and so on until all types reveal their information (Viscusi, 1978; Grossman
and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Okuno-Fujiwara et
al., 1990).
Note that the de￿nition of private receiver information includes cases where the receiver￿ s infor-
mation is not actually private but arrives after the sender￿ s decision to disclose or not. Therefore the
model applies to sender-receiver games where the sender has to decide on a disclosure policy before
knowing the exact environment, e.g., a professor decides to use ￿Dr￿on a namecard knowing that
this same namecard will be handed out in many di⁄erent situations where the receiver has di⁄erent
information about the professor. In some situations the namecard recipient will already have a high
impression of the professor based on information that is public to both sides, while in other cases
the public information will be less favorable. Since the professor must make a decision of how to
print the namecard based on the likely distribution of the public information, the situation ￿ts our
model.
A related interpretation of our model is that the quality of the sender is correlated with how
frequently the sender interacts with more ￿elite￿receivers who expect the sender to have good news.
For instance, the news that a person has a PhD makes a bigger impression on students and non-
4By allowing the sender to enjoy the bene￿ts of favorable information without looking overly anxious to disclose
it, such disclosure can also have positive incentive e⁄ects. For instance Jin and Leslie (2003) found that restaurant
hygiene, as measured by inspectors and also as re￿ected in the incidence of food-related illnesses, improved after
restaurants were forced to post their grades. Similarly, if students are reluctant to brag about their grades, then
directly posting their grades ensures that the information is released, thereby increasing study incentives for students.
3academics than it does on people who themselves have PhDs and interact mostly with other PhDs.
Therefore using the title ￿Dr￿reveals some favorable information about a person￿ s status, but at
the same time it also suggests that the person is often in an environment where having a PhD is
considered to be unusually good news. Because of these con￿ icting e⁄ects, the results of our model
apply and nondisclosure equilibria can arise.
The idea that an eagerness to show o⁄ can re￿ ect unfavorably on the sender was ￿rst formalized
by Teoh and Hwang (1991) who analyzed a two-period game in which a ￿rm decides whether or not
to immediately disclose news that will eventually be made public anyway. They show that holding
back on good news is a signal of con￿dence that hurts a ￿rm temporarily, but eventually separates
a high quality ￿rm from a low quality ￿rm which is less likely to have additional good news in the
future.5 Our approach di⁄ers in that we consider a standard disclosure game in which there is only
one period and the receiver does not learn of news that is withheld.6
Since we allow the receiver to have some private information, the approach is similar to that of
Feltovich et al. (2002) who analyze how private receiver information in signaling games can allow
for ￿countersignaling￿equilibria in which high types do not signal in order to show their con￿dence.
The current paper di⁄ers in that we consider a disclosure game with a restricted message space of
free and truthful messages, rather than a signaling game with an unrestricted space of increasingly
expensive messages that depend on their cost for their credibility. The paper also di⁄ers in that
we concentrate on pooling equilibria in which the fear of looking too anxious to disclose good news
leads all types with the same news or worse news to not disclose. Equilibria in which medium types
disclose while high types and low types do not disclose can also exist in disclosure games due to the
existence of private receiver information, but depend more on speci￿c distributional assumptions
than do the monotonic nondisclosure equilibria that we concentrate on.
Despite these di⁄erences, the intuition is very close to that of countersignaling in that the fear of
looking too anxious to show o⁄ leads high types to modestly withhold favorable information. The
di⁄erence is that in the Feltovich et al. (2002) model senders who are of high quality based on their
own private information are understated, while in this model senders who are already expected to
be of high quality based on common knowledge information are understated. Therefore this model
more clearly captures the simple intuition that those who are already thought to be of high quality
are less likely to engage in self-promotion.
In addition to Teoh and Hwang (1991) and Feltovich et al. (2002), the question of understate-
ment in sender-receiver games is investigated in several other papers. O￿ Neill (2002) shows how
countersignaling can arise when multiple receivers have di⁄erent information. Other models con-
sider why signals might not be monotonically increasing in type when the costs and bene￿ts of signals
are viewed more generally, e.g., there are opportunity costs of education (Orzach and Tauman, 2005;
Spence, 2001), or additional bene￿ts of education from learning about one￿ s own abilities (Hvide,
2003). Understatement in one dimension can also arise when there are multi-dimensional signals,
5In addition to the assumption that the sender￿ s news is eventually revealed independently of the sender￿ s disclosure
decision, Teoh and Hwang￿ s two-period game has two additional assumptions that re￿ect the institutional environment
they consider. First, the sender receives a payo⁄ both immediately after the choice to disclose and later after the
original news and any additional news is revealed. The equilibrium depends on the rate at which the second payo⁄
is discounted. Second, the sender￿ s news has a direct e⁄ect on sender payo⁄s beyond the usual indirect e⁄ect via
receiver estimates of the sender￿ s type.
6Of course in many situations aspects of both games will be present. For instance, there might be a positive
probability that the news will be released independently of the sender￿ s action. If for some reason this probability is
increasing in the sender￿ s type, then worse senders will have more incentive to disclose than better senders.
4e.g., the combination of high prices and modest advertising can signal high quality (Orzach et al.,
2002), and the combination of high prices and low observable quality can signal high unobservable
quality (Clements, 2002).7
In the following section we describe a simple model following the PhD example. In Section 3
we develop a model with multiple levels of good news that allows us to address more aspects of the
problem. In Section 4 we provide an empirical test of the model based on how titles are used by
academic economists and in Section 5 we conclude the paper.
2 An example
To see how private receiver information undermines the standard result that good news is disclosed,
consider the example of an instructor (the sender) and a student (the receiver). For simplicity
assume that instructor quality q is distributed uniformly on [0;1] and that the instructor￿ s payo⁄ is
just her expected quality. Assume that instructors with quality above some cuto⁄ q￿ have a PhD
while others do not. Instructors cannot directly reveal their quality q, but they can choose to reveal
the less informative signal that they have a PhD if in fact they have one.
First consider the case where the student does not have any private information. If the student
expects the instructor to reveal her PhD if she has one, then an instructor￿ s payo⁄ is E[q j q ￿ q￿] =
(1+q￿)=2 from disclosure but only E[q j q < q￿] = q￿=2 from nondisclosure. So clearly an instructor
with a PhD is better o⁄ revealing it and disclosure is an equilibrium. Can nondisclosure also be
an equilibrium without private receiver information? Since revealing good news is not expected,
no information is disclosed by the absence of disclosure and the instructor￿ s payo⁄ is E[q] = 1
2.
Whether the instructor can do better by deviating depends on what the student believes if the
instructor unexpectedly discloses. For instance, in the extreme the student might believe that the
instructor is as low as type q = q￿ or as high as type q = 1. The equilibrium re￿nements literature
argues that receiver beliefs should re￿ ect the relative incentives of di⁄erent types to deviate. In
this example all types of instructors have an equal incentive to deviate for any payo⁄s they might
receive, so the student has no reason to change her prior belief that the instructor￿ s quality is
distributed uniformly on [q￿;1].8 Given such beliefs, the instructor￿ s payo⁄ from disclosure is, as
before, E[q j q ￿ q￿] = (1 + q￿)=2 which is greater than E[q] = 1=2 so all instructors will deviate
and nondisclosure is not an equilibrium.
Now consider how this game changes if we allow the student to also have private information
about the instructor￿ s type. By private information, we mean information available to the student
at the time of evaluating the instructor, but not known by the instructor at the time of making the
disclosure decision. For instance, the student could form an impression of the instructor￿ s ability
over the course of the semester. Or the student could with some probability learn from another
source whether or not the professor has a PhD. We are interested in cases where this information is
noisy, so that the student learns something about the instructor, but does not learn so much that
the disclosure decision is irrelevant.
7Dynamic principal-agent models where high types try to pool with low types, e.g., ratchet e⁄ect models (Weitzman,
1981), can also be thought of as capturing an incentive to be understated. Avoiding jealousy is of course another
reason to be understated.
8Such beliefs are often referred to as passive beliefs or passive conjectures (Rasmusen, 1994). In the cheap talk
literature such beliefs are the basis for neologism proofness (Farrell, 1993).
5In particular, assume the student has a binary private signal L or H where Pr[H j q] = q
so that the chance of an H signal is higher for better instructors.9 This information does not
a⁄ect the existence of the disclosure equilibrium in which types q ￿ q￿ reveal their good news, but
what about a nondisclosure equilibrium in which instructors never disclose their PhD? In such an
equilibrium if the student has an H signal the instructor￿ s expected quality is E[q j H] =
R 1
0 q Pr[H j
q]dq=
R 1
0 Pr[H j q]dq = 2=3, and if the student has an L signal the instructor￿ s expected quality is
E[q j L] =
R 1
0 q Pr[L j q]dq=
R 1
0 Pr[L j q]dq = 1=3. Therefore, an instructor of type q has an expected
payo⁄ of qE[q j H] + (1 ￿ q)E[q j L] = q 2
3 + (1 ￿ q)1
3, which is increasing in q.
Since the expected payo⁄ from disclosing is increasing in the instructor￿ s type q, it is no longer
clear that a student should react agnostically to an instructor who unexpectedly reveals having a
PhD. For instance if q￿ = 1
3, then the worst type with a PhD (q = q￿) will deviate and announce





3 = 4=9, while the best type with a PhD (q = 1)
will do so only if the payo⁄ is greater than 12
3 + (1 ￿ 1)1
3 = 2=3. Since the worst instructor with
good news will deviate for a wider range of rationalizable payo⁄s than other instructors, standard
re￿nements say that more weight should be put on that type deviating. For instance, D1 says that
all weight should be put on type q = q￿ (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Cho and Sobel, 1990; Ramey, 1996),
implying that the payo⁄ from deviating is 1=3. But when deviation is viewed so skeptically, the
payo⁄ from deviating is less than from nondisclosure, 1=3 < 4=9, so nobody will deviate and the
nondisclosure equilibrium survives.10
This is seen in Figure 1(a) where the return from nondisclosure is increasing in sender type.
Among those who can disclose, for any q￿ type q = q￿ receives the lowest payo⁄ from nondisclosure
so she has the most incentive to deviate. Therefore, as shown more formally in the next section,
skepticism regarding types who unexpectedly disclose is appropriate based on standard belief re-
￿nements. Figure 1(b) shows the disclosure equilibrium for q￿ = 1=3 in which all types with good
news disclose, and Figure 1(c) shows a countersignaling equilibrium11 for q￿ = 1=3 in which only
medium types within the range [1=3;:885) disclose. The countersignaling equilibrium arises because
the highest types expect to be partially separated from low types due to the receiver￿ s private infor-
mation. As seen in Figure 1(d), in this example the disclosure equilibrium o⁄ers all types q ￿ q￿ a
higher payo⁄, but in general the payo⁄s cannot be ranked.12
Given the multiplicity of equilibria, confusion over whether one should disclose, and who might
have disclosed if disclosure is observed, is clearly understandable. With respect to deviations from the
nondisclosure equilibrium, note that strong, D1-like re￿nements play the opposite role in this model
than they do in standard signaling games. In particular, D1 always eliminates pooling equilibria
in standard signaling games because better types have lower signaling costs so they are willing to
deviate for a larger range of payo⁄s. In this model the presence of private receiver information and
the absence of signaling costs reverses the incentives to deviate. Better types do not have any lower
9This structure can also capture the case where the student independently learns with some probability whether
the instructor has a Ph.D. For instance H can represent the case where the student learns q ￿ q￿ and L the case
where the student learns nothing.
10The nondisclosure equilibrium also survives the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) because any type is
willing to deviate if it will be perceived as the best type by doing so, implying that no type can be ruled out as the
source of a deviation.
11We use this terminology due to the equilibrium￿ s similarity to the type of countersignaling equilibria emphasized
by Feltovich et al. (2002) in signaling games.
12For instance if Pr[H j q] = q3, then some types q ￿ q￿ prefer the nondisclosure equilibrium to the countersignaling
equilibrium, and the highest types prefer the countersignaling equilibrium to the disclosure equilibrium.
6Figure 1: Expected payo⁄s as a function of q for di⁄erent equilibria.
costs of disclosing so they are no more eager to deviate than worse types. Instead, because of the
private receiver information, better types expect to be evaluated more favorably in the nondisclosure
equilibrium, so they must be given a larger payo⁄ to induce them to deviate. Therefore, skeptical
beliefs are not just permitted under D1 but are actually required.13
As this simple example highlights, private receiver information changes disclosure games consid-
erably when the sender￿ s quality cannot be fully revealed by the veri￿able message. As a result,
the question is not just identifying conditions under which nondisclosure equilibria can exist, but
￿nding reasonable conditions under which nondisclosure equilibria can be ruled out. For instance if
the cuto⁄ q￿ for receiving a PhD is high enough then even if the student viewed disclosure of a PhD
with complete skepticism and thought the instructor was of type q￿, the payo⁄from disclosure would
still be higher than from nondisclosure. In the following section we develop a more general model
with multiple levels of good news to examine when nondisclosure of some form is an equilibrium and
when disclosure is the unique equilibrium.
13Feltovich et al. (2002) ￿nd that in the presence of private receiver information D1 can lose its power to ensure a
unique equilibrium in signaling games. However, D1 still implies a unique equilibrium in signaling games if the private
receiver information is not too important and signaling costs are decreasing in type at a su¢ cient rate. In disclosure
games the role of signaling costs is not present so the e⁄ect of private receiver information dominates.
73 The model
In this sender-receiver game there are three sources of information: a nonveri￿able signal q 2 [0;1]
observed by the sender (the sender￿ s type or quality), a nonveri￿able signal x 2 X observed by
the receiver, and a veri￿able signal v 2 V observed by the sender. To ensure that the receiver￿ s
signal is informative about q, we assume that X ￿ R has at least two elements and that the joint
distribution F(q;x) has full support on and displays strict a¢ liation on [0;1] ￿ X.14 To allow
analysis of how the varying coarseness of veri￿able information a⁄ects disclosure, we assume that
V = fv1;:::;vNg where each element corresponds to a subinterval of the sender￿ s typespace. In




N+1g de￿nes a partition of [0;1] into N +1 adjacent,
non-empty, sub-intervals [q￿
j;q￿
j+1) for j = 0;1;:::;N where q￿
0 = 0 and q￿
N+1 = 1.15 Assume that
v = vj if q 2 [q￿
j;q￿
j+1) for j = 1;2;:::;N. Note that senders of type q 2 [0;q￿
1) have no veri￿able
information, i.e. the sender cannot verify the absence of any news.16
The timing of the game is the sender learns her private information q and veri￿able signal v
and then sends a message m. The receiver learns his private information x either before or after
hearing the sender￿ s message m. After learning x and hearing m the receiver takes an action a. We
assume that the sender can send the message v or no message at all, so m(q) 2 fv;￿g is the sender￿ s
message pro￿le. We say a type ￿discloses￿when it sends message v. For senders q 2 [0;q￿
1) without
veri￿able information m(q) = ￿. To simplify the presentation, we make the standard assumption
that the receiver maximizes his payo⁄when the action a equals his estimate of the sender￿ s type and
that the sender￿ s payo⁄ equals this estimate. That is, we assume that the receiver￿ s payo⁄ function
takes the quadratic loss form uR = ￿(q ￿ a)2 and the sender￿ s payo⁄ function takes the linear form
uS = a.17 Note that in this disclosure game neither x nor v has a direct impact on either player￿ s
payo⁄.18 Their only in￿ uence is via the receiver￿ s estimate of q and consequent action a.
We consider only pure strategy equilibria so a strategy is a mapping between types and messages.
Let the function ￿(q j x;m) be a conditional probability measure representing receiver beliefs about
the sender￿ s type given the message m and private information x. Our equilibrium concept is that
of a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 A pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by a veri￿able message pro￿le
m(q), a receiver action pro￿le a(x;m), and receiver beliefs ￿(q j x;m) where:
1. For all q, m(q) 2 argmaxm0 E[uS(a(x;m0)) j q];
2. For all x and m, a(x;m) = argmaxa0 E￿[uR(q;a0) j x;m];
3. ￿(q j x;m) is updated from the sender￿ s strategy and F using Bayes￿rule whenever possible.
14A¢ liation, also known as total positivity of order 2, is a strong form of correlation (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
15For notational convenience, throughout the paper we follow convention and ignore the open/closed set distinction
for the ￿nal subinterval [q￿
N;q￿
N+1] .
16For instance, the sender has a certi￿cate to prove they passed an exam but nothing to prove that they failed it.
17Based on Theorem 2 of (Athey, 2002), it can be shown that a¢ liation of x and q implies that our results hold
as long as the receiver￿ s payo⁄ function uR(q;a) satis￿es the single-crossing property and the sender￿ s payo⁄ function
uS(a) is strictly increasing in a. The model can also be generalized to allow for messages and actions by multiple
players following Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990).
18In this respect disclosure games are similar to cheap talk games Crawford and Sobel (1982). Disclosure games
di⁄er from cheap talk games in that the sender has veri￿able messages.
8Condition (1) requires that the sender￿ s message is a best response to the receiver￿ s expected
actions. Condition (2) requires that the receiver￿ s action is a best response to the sender￿ s message.
Condition (3) requires that for any information set that can be reached on the equilibrium path, the
receiver￿ s beliefs are consistent with Bayes￿rule and the equilibrium sender strategy. We are often
interested in the simple case where the receiver believes that a certain subset of types either disclose
or do not disclose. Therefore we de￿ne the expected quality of the sender given x and given that
the sender is believed to be in set Q ￿ [0;1] as ￿ qQ(x) = E[q j x;q 2 Q].
In this model it is always an equilibrium for all types who can disclose to disclose. The proof
(and all subsequent proofs) is in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 A full disclosure equilibrium always exists.
In standard disclosure models without private receiver information and with a veri￿able message
for each type, full disclosure is the unique equilibrium due to ￿unravelling.￿ Since types with the
best news will always reveal it, types with the next best news will therefore also reveal it, and so on
until all news has been revealed. In the example of Section 2 with only binary news, it was shown
that unravelling in our model can fail at the very ￿rst step￿ even the types with the best available
news might not reveal it. We are interested in conditions under which the best types will in fact
reveal their news and, when their are multiple levels of news, how far unravelling will continue.
To this end, for any 0 < q0 ￿ q00 ￿ 1, de￿ne
q￿(q0;q00;q) = sup
Q
fE[￿ qQ(x) j q] : [0;q0) ￿ Q ￿ [0;q00)g: (1)
This can be interpreted as the maximum possible nondisclosure payo⁄ for sender q given that the
receiver believes senders q < q0 never disclose and senders q ￿ q00 always disclose.19 Note that
q￿(q0;q00;q) is nonincreasing in q0 since higher q0 implies a tighter restriction on Q, and nondecreasing
in q00 since higher q00 implies a weaker restriction on Q. And q￿(q0;q00;q) is strictly increasing in q
since E[￿ qQ(x) j q] is strictly increasing in q for all non-singleton Q by strict a¢ liation of q and x.
No matter how skeptically the sender views disclosure, a sender who discloses vj is at worst of
type q = q￿
j. Therefore it would seem that for q￿
j large enough the sender will receive a higher payo⁄
from disclosure than from any other outcome which involves pooling with lower types who cannot
disclose. To see this de￿ne
~ qj = maxfq : q￿(q￿
1;q￿
j+1;q) = qg (2)
where the existence of ~ qj follows from the fact that q￿(q0;q00;q) is continuous in q and falls in the
range [0;1]. This corresponds to the highest intersection between q and the highest payo⁄ from
nondisclosure when receiver beliefs are restricted to believing that types q < q￿
1 cannot disclose and
types q ￿ q￿
j+1 disclose.20
First consider the simplest case where N = 1. Since the worst possible payo⁄ from disclosure
is q￿
1, if q￿
1 > ~ q1 the sender will do better from disclosure than from any possible payo⁄ under
19This excludes cases where the receiver believes that the sender plays mixed strategies, but this is of no consequence
as any expected mixed-strategy payo⁄ can be attained through the appropriate choice of Q.
20Since q￿(q0;q00;q) is nondecreasing in q00, it follows from Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) that ~ qj is
nondecreasing in j.
9nondisclosure so disclosure is the unique equilibrium. For instance, from the example of Section 2,
computations indicate that ~ q1 = 0:52. When there are more veri￿able messages, clearly they will
also be disclosed if the cuto⁄ for each of them is above ~ qN, i.e. news vj will be disclosed if q￿
j > ~ qN.
Therefore the simplest su¢ cient condition for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium is just
q￿
1 > ~ qN. In this case even the least impressive news is still better than no news at all.
We are interested in a weaker su¢ cient condition that gives a role for unravelling. If q￿
N > ~ qN
then types with the best news vN will disclose, which means that the attractiveness of nondisclosure
by types with news vN￿1 decreases. So they will always disclose under the weaker condition that
q￿
N￿1 > ~ qN￿1. If they then disclose then this same logic applies to types with news vN￿2, etc.
Because the ~ qj are nondecreasing in j, unravelling implies that the standard for impressiveness
becomes less strict as unravelling progresses from the best news down. For instance, if a Ph.D. is
su¢ ciently rare that it is disclosed, then it becomes more likely that an M.A. is disclosed, in which
case it is also more likely that a B.A. is disclosed.
The following proposition uses these arguments to show when any equilibrium must involve a
certain degree of disclosure. Unlike the classic unravelling results, this proposition does not imply
that full unravelling or even any unravelling at all will necessarily occur. Instead, it gives the con-
ditions under which di⁄erent levels of news are su¢ ciently favorable that they are always disclosed.
Essentially it says that a given level of news will be disclosed if it is su¢ ciently impressive conditional
on higher levels of news being disclosed because they too are su¢ ciently impressive.
Proposition 2 If q￿
k > ~ qk for all k ￿ j then in any equilibrium news v ￿ vj is disclosed.
This proposition shows that full disclosure can be an equilibrium if the veri￿able news is su¢ -
ciently favorable. The following result extends the unravelling argument to show that full disclosure
is the unique equilibrium if the veri￿able information is su¢ ciently ￿ne. When the veri￿able mes-
sages separate the di⁄erent types su¢ ciently well, the highest types have an incentive to disclose
their (exceptionally) good news vN even if they are thought of as being only of type q￿
N rather than
from the range [q￿
N;1]. Given that the highest types disclose vN, the next highest types have an
incentive to disclose vN￿1 even under skeptical beliefs as well, and the unravelling continues until
all news is disclosed.21
Proposition 3 Given q￿
1, if the partition de￿ned by P is su¢ ciently ￿ne then full disclosure is the
unique equilibrium.
So far we have examined when full disclosure is the unique equilibrium or when any equilibrium
must involve disclosure by those with su¢ ciently good news. Now consider nondisclosure. We expect
that nondisclosure arises when q￿
j is relatively low so revealing good news is not so impressive. The
following proposition shows that nondisclosure is an equilibrium if the standard for good news is
insu¢ ciently high. We look at the simplest case of a monotone nondisclosure equilibrium in which
it is always the relatively bad news that is withheld. In particular, su¢ cient conditions are given on
the size of q￿
j such that an equilibrium exists in which vj and any worse news is not disclosed.22 To
21Note that the proof is for a given q￿
1. Having some mass of the lowest types who never disclose even as the
partition becomes ￿ner is necessary to ensure that disclosure eventually dominates nondisclosure for higher types.
22In general nondisclosure behavior need not be monotonic in v and moreover, given a particular vj, need not even
be monotonic within Qj as seen from the countersignaling equilibrium in Section 2.
10see this, let ^ qj be given by
^ qj = minfq : E[￿ q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q] = qg (3)
where the existence of ^ qj follows from the fact that E[￿ q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q] is continuous in q and falls in
the range [0;1].23
Proposition 4 If q￿
j ￿ ^ qj then an equilibrium in which news v ￿ vj is not disclosed exists and
survives both the Intuitive Criterion and D1.
Note that this result implies that a full nondisclosure equilibrium exists if q￿
N < ^ qN. In the
example of the Section 2 where N = 1, ^ q1 is just the point where the minimum assured payo⁄ from
disclosure equals the expected payo⁄from nondisclosure. This is the intersection of the nondisclosure
payo⁄line in Figure 1(a) with the 45￿ line, or ^ q1 = 1=2. Because ~ qj allows for a wider range of receiver
beliefs than ^ qj, in general ^ qj ￿ ~ qj so that the condition from Proposition 2 assuring that disclosure
is the unique equilibrium is stricter than the condition from this proposition assuring existence
of a nondisclosure equilibrium. This re￿ ects the fact that both conditions are su¢ cient rather
than necessary,24 and that there may be other more complex equilibria such as countersignaling
equilibria.25
Regarding re￿nements, the nondisclosure equilibria examined in Proposition 4 assume that the
receiver skeptically believes that a sender who deviates from nondisclosure is of the lowest type who
could deviate. So the question is whether such beliefs are reasonable based on ￿forward induction￿
arguments about which types have the strongest incentive to deviate. The most common re￿nements
that restrict beliefs on this basis are the Intuitive Criterion and D1-like re￿nements. The Intuitive
Criterion states that the receiver should put zero probability on a type having deviated if it would
not bene￿t from deviation under the most favorable possible beliefs about who deviates. Clearly the
Intuitive Criterion does not restrict any type from disclosing since every type would be very happy to
disclose if they would be thought of as the highest type by doing so. So skeptical beliefs supporting
a nondisclosure equilibrium cannot be ruled out. D1 states that if one type bene￿ts from deviation
for a smaller set of rationalizable payo⁄s than another type, zero weight should be put on the ￿rst
type (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Cho and Sobel, 1990; Ramey, 1996). In a nondisclosure equilibrium
higher types expect to be evaluated more favorably than lower types because of the private receiver
information, so they must be given a larger payo⁄ to induce them to deviate. Therefore, not only
does D1 have no power to re￿ne away the nondisclosure equilibrium, it actually reinforces it by
dictating that out-of-equilibrium actions must be viewed skeptically.
Proposition 2 shows that if standards are set high enough then nondisclosure cannot be an
equilibrium. Proposition 4 shows that if standards are set low enough then nondisclosure is always
an equilibrium. The following proposition uses these results to show how the distribution of sender
types a⁄ects the potential for nondisclosure equilibria. In particular it shows that if there is any
common knowledge information that makes the conditional distribution more favorable, then the
23Since E[q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q] is strictly increasing in j, it follows from Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) that
^ qj is strictly increasing in j.
24The necessary condition for a monotone nondisclosure equilibrium just replaces min with max in equation (2) and
has the same properties as ^ qj.
25When N = 1, q is distributed uniformly, and X is binary, it can be shown that a countersignaling equilibrium
exists in which types q 2 [q￿
1;q0] disclose while types q 2 (q0;1] do not for some q0 2 (q￿
1;1) if q￿
1 < ^ q1. Moving beyond
this special case, su¢ cient conditions for such equilibria are di¢ cult to attain.
11Figure 2: Impact of extra information y on e q1 and ^ q1.
conditions for the uniqueness of disclosure equilibria become stricter and the conditions for the
existence of nondisclosure equilibria become less strict. It then shows that if this information is
su¢ ciently favorable then the existence of nondisclosure equilibria is assured, while if it is su¢ ciently
unfavorable then any equilibrium involves some disclosure.
Proposition 5 Let y be a random variable that is common knowledge. (i) If y is strictly a¢ liated
with q then ~ qj and ^ qj are strictly increasing in y. (ii) If F(q￿
j j y) is su¢ ciently large then news
v > vj is disclosed in any equilibrium. (iii) If F(q￿
j j y) is su¢ ciently small then an equilibrium
surviving the Intuitive Criterion and D1 exists in which news v ￿ vj is not disclosed.
Note that part (ii) implies that full disclosure is the unique equilibrium if the information y is
so unfavorable about the sender that F(q￿
N j y) is su¢ ciently large, and part (iii) implies that full
nondisclosure is an equilibrium if the extra information y is so favorable that F(q￿
1 j y) is su¢ ciently
small.
One way to test the model is through observing how behavior changes when q￿
j changes. For
instance, in the restaurant example if grading standards change so that an A becomes more common
then that is equivalent to q￿
N decreasing. This makes it less likely that q￿
N > ~ qN so that disclosure
is assured, and more likely that q￿
N < ^ qN so that a nondisclosure equilibrium exists. Alternatively,
Proposition 5 shows that, even if standards do not not change, ~ qj and ^ qj change based on any public
information. For example, the public information might be whether or not a faculty member works
at an elite university. The more favorable is this public information the higher are ~ qj and ^ qj, so the
less likely it is that q￿
j > ~ qj and the more likely it is that q￿
j < ^ qj.
To see how public information produces testable implications of the model, consider the example
from Section 2 where N = 1 and assume there is an additional signal y 2 fl;hg where Pr[y = h j
q] = q and y is independent of x conditional on q. If y = h (y = l) is observed by both the sender
and receiver, then the distribution of types conditional on this information is weighted upwards
(downwards), so for any non-degenerate Q, E[￿ qQ(x) j q;y = h] > E[￿ qQ(x) j q] > E[￿ qQ(x) j q;y = l],
thereby implying ~ q1 and ^ q1 are higher for y = h and lower for y = l as shown in Proposition 5(i).
Figure 2 shows ~ q1 and ^ q1 for the example from Section 2. The left panel shows the highest possible
12payo⁄ to nondisclosure for any receiver beliefs about who discloses, and the right panel shows the
payo⁄ to nondisclosure when no types are expected to disclose. In each case the middle line is for
the base case without extra public information, the top line is when y = h, and the bottom line is
when y = l. The point where these lines intersect the 45￿ line determine ~ q1 and ^ q1. When y = l
the receiver starts with such a low opinion of the sender that there is a good chance that q￿
1 > ~ q1
so the sender will always disclose even relatively mediocre news. But when y = h the receiver starts
with a more favorable opinion and there is a good chance that q￿
1 < ^ q1 so that nondisclosure is an
equilibrium.
4 Empirical test
We now examine a simple test of the model￿ s predictions following the example of title usage discussed
in the introduction. In particular we are interested in when professors use the title ￿Dr￿ , ￿PhD￿ , or
￿Professor￿and when they go by their names alone. This decision arises in many contexts including
curricula vitae, business cards, o¢ ce doors, web sites, email signatures, etc. We have chosen to
look at two cases where a su¢ ciently large sample is obtainable and where the choice is likely to be
completely within the control of the professor￿ o¢ ce voicemail greetings and class syllabi.
To minimize regional variation we look at all state universities in California, and to minimize the
impact of di⁄erent traditions in di⁄erent disciplines we restrict attention to economics departments.
In particular we consider tenure-track faculty (assistant, associate, and full professors which we refer
to collectively as ￿faculty￿ ) with PhDs at all 26 universities in the University of California and
California State University systems with economics departments.26 Eight of these have doctoral
programs (￿doctoral universities￿ ) and 18 do not (￿non-doctoral universities￿ ).27
Excluding faculty whose web pages indicated a primary position in another department, o¢ ce,
institute, or university, in total we consider 430 professors, 226 at doctoral universities and 204
at non-doctoral universities. In many cases voicemail was not working, was automated without a
personal greeting, or was recorded by a secretary. We were able to obtain usable voicemail greetings
data for about three-￿fths of the faculty in both doctoral and non-doctoral universities. For course
syllabi we followed links available on faculty pages and used the ￿rst listed undergraduate syllabus.28
Many faculty did not have links to syllabi or their syllabi were password protected. We were able to
obtain syllabi for about half of the faculty at doctoral universities and about a third of the faculty
at non-doctoral universities.
Proposition 5 provides formal support for the intuition that faculty are most likely to use titles
when their status as a PhD or a professor represents more positive news relative to expectations. In
non-doctoral universities it was once common for many faculty to not have a PhD, while in doctoral
universities it has long been standard in most disciplines for almost all faculty to have a PhD.29
26We excluded from the analysis one university which listed only one regular faculty member (the chair) in the
economics department.
27We make this distinction based only on the presence of a doctoral program in economics. Many of the ￿non-
doctoral universities￿have doctoral programs in other ￿elds.
28When a syllabus for a given class was in multiple formats, we chose the format most likely to be handed out in
class, e.g., the .pdf or .doc format over the .html format.
29As recently as 1987 the fraction of all full-time faculty with PhDs at non-doctoral universities in the sample
averaged only 72%. At this same time at least 95% of the full-time faculty at each doctoral university in the sample




No Title 87 125
Fisher Exact p<.0001
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p<.0005





No Title 15 59
Fisher Exact p<.0005
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p<.05
Robust Rank Order p<.05
Syllabus
Table 1: Di⁄erential use of titles in economics departments.
Similarly, many faculty at non-doctoral universities are part-time lecturers, while almost all faculty
at doctoral universities are full-time faculty members.30 Therefore, in terms of Proposition 5, we
can think of being at a non-doctoral university as an unfavorable signal y that lowers expectations,
and of being at a doctoral university as a favorable signal y that raises expectations. As illustrated
in Figure 2, these di⁄erential expectations imply that faculty in non-doctoral universities will be
more likely to advertise good news about themselves.
Table 1 provides evidence that is consistent with this prediction. For voicemail greetings, the
use of a title is far more common at non-doctoral universities. Overall about 27% of faculty use a
title at non-doctoral universities while less than 4% use a title at doctoral universities. In syllabi a
similar pattern holds. More than 78% of faculty at non-doctoral universities use either title while
only about 52% do at doctoral universities.31
The di⁄erences in faculty behavior at doctoral and non-doctoral universities presented in Table 1
are all highly signi￿cant under the assumption that each professor￿ s behavior is independent. Looking
at the one-sided p-values generated by the non-parametric Fisher exact test, p < 0:0001 for di⁄erent
use of a title in voicemail greetings and p < 0:0005 for di⁄erent use of a title in syllabi. However,
the assumption of independence is strong because there may be university- or department-speci￿c
factors that push all professors in a department in one or another direction. For instance, since
there are multiple equilibria in our model, it may simply be ￿focal￿for professors in a department
to present themselves in a certain way.
To allow for this possibility, we drop the independence assumption at the university level and
treat each university as a single data point. To do this we consider the fraction of the professors
in each university who use a title and rank these fractions across universities. The non-parametric
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test generates p-values for the null hypothesis that there are no di⁄erences
in these fractions between doctoral and non-doctoral universities. Looking at these one-sided values,
p < 0:0005 for di⁄erent use of a title in voicemail greetings, and p < 0:05 for di⁄erent use of a title
in syllabi. A problem with this test is that it assumes the underlying distributions (higher order
30In 2003 the percent of all faculty that were full-time ranged from 64% to 83% at non-doctoral universities in the
sample, and from 89% to 94% at doctoral universities in the sample. Numbers are from America￿ s Best Colleges,
2004 edition, by US News and World Report.
31We do not have a theory for which particular titles faculty will use. Empirically, faculty at doctoral universities
have a strong tendency to substitute ￿Professor￿for ￿Dr￿and ￿PhD.￿Only one faculty member used ￿Dr￿or ￿PhD￿
in a voicemail greeting and only one used such a title in a syllabus. In contrast, at non-doctoral universities 10 faculty
used such a title in voicemail greetings and 29 faculty used such a title in syllabi.
14moments) are the same. Hence it can reject the null hypothesis based on di⁄erences in variances
even if the means are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent. We therefore consider the robust rank-order test
which requires only that the distributions be symmetric. Continuing to look at one-sided p-values
for the null hypothesis of no di⁄erences between title usage in doctoral and non-doctoral universities,
we again ￿nd that p < 0:0005 for voicemail greetings and p < 0:05 for syllabi.32
It may seem that an alternative explanation for the di⁄erences in voicemail greetings is that
the likely callers at doctoral and non-doctoral universities are di⁄erent. For instance a caller to a
doctoral university is probably more likely to be a professor who expects that the answerer is also
a professor with a PhD. As explained in the introduction, our model incorporates such cases where
the sender determines a disclosure decision in knowledge of the likely distribution of receivers. If
callers to a doctoral university have a higher expectation that the answerer is a professor with a
PhD this is equivalent to there being more favorable public information about the seller as examined
in Proposition 5. In particular, as explained in the introduction, the model can be interpreted as
the caller using information from the professor￿ s greeting to estimate how frequently the professor
receives calls from students and from professors under the assumption that higher quality professors
receive more calls from other professors.
An alternative explanation for the di⁄erences in both voicemail greetings and syllabi is that using
a title is not entirely costless so it is not worthwhile for professors at doctoral universities to use
titles given their small information content. However, in many cases a simple title is as easy or
easier to state than other formulations. For instance, in voicemail greetings faculty often inform the
listener that ￿you have reached the o¢ ce of X￿in place of simply stating ￿this is Professor X.￿And
in course syllabi faculty often substitute ￿Instructor￿for ￿Professor.￿Moreover, failure to use a title
is itself costly in terms of misunderstandings by poorly informed students and others.33 If it were
not for the negative inferences that can arise from promoting one￿ s own status, it seems unlikely
that so many professors would avoid titles.34
5 Conclusion
A large body of research in accounting, ￿nance, and economics concludes that costless disclosure of
good news should bene￿t the sender. In this paper we consider a standard disclosure game assuming
that good news does not fully reveal the sender￿ s quality and that the receiver also has private
information about sender quality. We show that the presence of any private receiver information,
no matter how weak, implies that equilibria with nondisclosure by some or all types exist unless the
good news is restricted to su¢ ciently high quality senders. From a policy perspective the model
supports the setting of higher and more ￿nely distinguished standards in order to reduce the scope
for nondisclosure equilibria. It also provides support for mandatory or third-party disclosure of
32For voicemail greetings, ￿ U = ￿6:357, m = 8, and n = 18. For class syllabi, ￿ U = ￿2:009, m = 8 and n = 17.
Critical values are from Feltovich (2005).
33For instance, use of ￿Assistant Professor￿on a syllabus has been known to induce unhappy students to demand
to see the ￿real￿professor.
34Consistent with the result that disclosure by a third party does not su⁄er from the same problems as self-
promotion, faculty seem happy to let others refer to them by titles. In the 23 instances of voicemail greetings recorded
by sta⁄, either ￿Dr￿ or ￿Professor￿ was used 13 times, and there was no di⁄erence between usage in doctoral and
non-doctoral universities. Similarly, faculty don￿ t seem to object to the use of titles on department pages for faculty,
but usually avoid them on their own home pages. Because of the di¢ culty of determining the authorship of home
pages, we did not formally analyze this di⁄erence.
15information as a way to reduce the damage that ￿false modesty￿can have on communication.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: In the full disclosure outcome the receiver believes the sender to be
of type q 2 [0;q￿
1) when nondisclosure is observed and of type q 2 [q￿
j;q￿
j+1) when message vj is
observed. Therefore, since ￿ q[q￿
j ;q￿
j+1)(x) > ￿ q[0;q￿
j )(x) for all x, E[￿ q[q￿
j ;q￿
j+1)(x) j q] > E[￿ q[0;q￿
j )(x) j q] for
all q 2 [q￿
j;q￿
j+1), so full disclosure is an equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: Starting with the highest types, if q￿
N > ~ qN then types q 2 [q￿
N;1] strictly
prefer to disclose vN by the de￿nition of ~ qN. In this case if q￿
N￿1 > ~ qN￿1 then types q 2 [q￿
N￿1;q￿
N)
strictly prefer to disclose vN￿1 by the de￿nition of ~ qN￿1. The unraveling continues until types
q 2 [q￿
j;q￿
j+1) disclose vj. ￿








i;Ni+1 = 1 for any i. Let the sequence (Pi)1






i;j+1g ! 0, there is some i1 such that q￿
i1;Ni1 > q￿(q￿
1;1;1). Moreover,
for any i > i1, q￿
i;Ni > q￿(q￿
1;1;1). Let z1 = minjfqi1;j j qi1;j > q￿(q￿
1;1;1)g. It follows that for
any qi1;j ￿ z1, if q 2 [q￿
i1;j;q￿
i1;j+1) then E[￿ q[q￿
i1;j;q￿
i1;j+1)(x) j q] > q￿(q￿
1;1;1) so that all senders with
q ￿ z1 strictly prefer to disclose.
Following the above arguments, there is some i2 ￿ i1 such that there is some j where q￿(q￿
1;1;1) >
qi2;j > q￿(q￿
1;z1;z1). Let z2 = minjfqi2;j j qi2;j > q￿(q￿
1;z1;z1)g. It follows that for any qi2;j 2
[z2;q￿(q￿
1;1;1)), if q 2 [q￿
i2;j;q￿
i2;j+1) then E[￿ q[q￿
i2;j;q￿
i2;j+1) j q] > q￿(q￿
1;z1;z1) so that all senders with
q ￿ z2 strictly prefer to disclose.
Repeat for k = 3;4;::: until zk = q￿
1. Since [0;q￿
1) has positive mass, this must happen for ￿nite
k. Denote the stopping point as K. For any i ￿ iK, the partition de￿ned by Pi will be such that
if q ￿ q￿
1 then E[￿ q[q￿
i;j;q￿
i;j+1) j q] > q￿(q￿
1;q￿
1;q￿
1) so that all senders with q ￿ q￿
1 strictly prefer to
disclose. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider the particular equilibrium in which news v ￿ vj is not disclosed
while news v > vj is disclosed. First consider senders q 2 [q￿
k;q￿
k+1) for k ￿ j. Assume that following
an unexpected disclosure of vk for k ￿ j, the receiver skeptically believes that ￿(q j x;vk) = 0 for
q > q￿
k. This yields the lowest possible out of equilibrium payo⁄ of q￿
k. Since q￿
k ￿ ^ qj, it follows by
the de￿nition of ^ qj that E[￿ q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q = q￿
k] ￿ q￿
k. Since E[￿ q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q] is strictly increasing
in q it then follows that E[￿ q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q] ￿ q￿
k for all q 2 [q￿
k;q￿
k+1). Therefore the payo⁄ from
nondisclosure is weakly more than the payo⁄ from disclosure of vk.
Now consider senders q 2 [q￿
k;q￿
k+1) for k > j. The expected equilibrium payo⁄ from disclosure
for these senders is bounded below by q￿
k ￿ q￿
j+1, while the expected nondisclosure payo⁄ is strictly
bounded above by q￿
j+1. Therefore the payo⁄ from nondisclosure is strictly less than the payo⁄ from
disclosure of vk and the proposed equilibrium holds.
Regarding the Intuitive Criterion, the question is whether the beliefs ￿(q j x;vk) = 0 for q 2
(qk;qk+1) and k ￿ j are permissible based on the criterion. The least upper-bound on the out-of-
equilibrium payo⁄ to a sender of type q 2 [q￿
k;q￿
k+1) is q￿
k+1. That is, for out-of-equilibrium beliefs
16that put su¢ cient weight on the upper end of [q￿
k;q￿
k+1), the sender￿ s payo⁄ can be made arbitrarily
close to q￿
k+1. Let ￿ Q = fq 2 [q￿
k;q￿
k+1) : E[￿ q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q] ￿ q￿
k+1g. If ￿ Q = [q￿
k;q￿
k+1) then no
type would ever deviate under the most favorable beliefs so there is no restriction on beliefs. If,
however, ￿ Q 6= [q￿
k;q￿
k+1), then the Intuitive Criterion requires out-of-equilibrium beliefs must put
zero probability on the event that a sender of type q 2 ￿ Q deviated by disclosing vj. Therefore, for
the equilibrium to fail the Intuitive Criterion, it must be that q￿




k+1)(x) j q] is increasing and continuous in q, if ￿ Q is nonempty, it must be an interval of
the form [￿ q;q￿
k+1) for some ￿ q so this is impossible.
Regarding the D1 re￿nement, under D1 beliefs must put zero weight on any type which is
willing to deviate for a strictly smaller range of rationalizable payo⁄s than another type. Since
E[￿ q[0;q￿
k+1)(x) j q] is strictly increasing in q, the set of rationalizable payo⁄s that dominate a sender￿ s




k+1)(x) j q] is increasing in q, this set is largest for type q = q￿
k, so D1 implies skeptical beliefs
where ￿(q j x;d) = 0 for all q > q￿
k. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) Regarding ~ qj, strict a¢ liation implies that E[￿ qQ(x) j q;y] is strictly
increasing in y for all non-singleton Q. Therefore supQfE[￿ qQ(x) j q;y] : [0;q0) ￿ Q ￿ [0;q00)g is
strictly increasing in y, so q￿(q0;q00;q) is strictly increasing in y. Since q￿(q0;q00;q)￿q is continuous in
q and q￿(q0;q00;q) 2 [0;1] for all q and y, the conclusion follows directly from Theorem 1 of Milgrom
and Roberts (1994). Similarly, regarding ^ qj, E[￿ q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q;y] ￿ q is continuous in q and strictly
increasing in y and E[￿ q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q;y] 2 [0;1] for all q and y. So again the conclusion follows
directly from Theorem 1 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994). (ii) The question is whether, if the mass
of F is su¢ ciently concentrated below a given q￿
j, it is assured that ~ qj < q￿
j. Consider the set of ~ qj
arising from the partition de￿ned by P. If F(q￿




for all q since there is full support and nearly all of the mass is below q￿
j. Thus ~ qj < q￿
j. (iii) The
question is whether, if the mass of F is su¢ ciently concentrated above a given q￿
j, it is assured that
^ qj > q￿
j. Consider the set of ^ qj arising from the partition de￿ned by P. If F(q￿
j j y) is su¢ ciently
close to 0, E[￿ q[0;q￿
j+1)(x) j q] > q￿
j for all q since there is full support and nearly all of the mass is
above q￿
j. Thus ^ qj > q￿
j. ￿
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